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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions in a society leads to negative outcomes in
civil conict and economic development, among others. It is often argued that the lack of shared
social identity, that is, the dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic) identities over national
identity, lies behind the negative outcomes. If shared national identity is important, how can it
be realized? Some stress the e¤ectiveness of "nation-building" policies in strengthening national
identity. Meanwhile, there exist conicting theses on e¤ects of the modernization of a society on
national identity in political science, the classic thesis (such as Deutsch, Gellner, Weber) arguing
positive e¤ects and the competing thesis (such as Melson and Wolpe, Bates) arguing negative e¤ects.
Which thesis is more relevant under what conditions? How does modernization a¤ect identity,
conict, and development? How do policies such as "nation-building" policies a¤ect the outcomes?
In order to examine these questions theoretically, this paper develops a model of social identity,
ethnic conict, and development. In the model, individuals choose a sector to work (between
the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic identity and national
identity), and contributions to ethnic conict. Thus, the degree of modernization (and output),
identity, and conict interact with each other.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions or diversity in a society lead to negative out-
comes in various dimensions, including internal armed conict (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray, 2012),
public goods provision (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), and economic development (Montalvo and
Reynal-Quero, 2005) among others.1 It is often argued that the lack of shared social identity,
that is, the dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic) identities over national identity, lies
behind the negative outcomes in ethnically heterogenous societies (Collier, 2009; Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2015).2
If shared national identity is important, how can it be realized? Miguel (2004) and Collier
(2009), based on case study and statistical analysis, argue that "nation-building" policies, such as
the promotion of a national language and school education emphasizing common history, culture,
and values, are e¤ective in strengthening national identity.3 Meanwhile, in political science, there
exist competing theses emphasizing e¤ects of modernization (including industrialization, the di¤u-
sion of education, and urbanization) on national identity (see Robinson, 2014, for an overview). The
classic thesis, based on the past experience of Europe, is that modernization leads to widespread
national identity at the expense of ethnic and other subnational identities (Deutsch, 1953; Gellner,
1964, 1983; Weber, 1979; see Llobera, 1999, for a review). By contrast, based on post-independent
experience of Africa, another inuential thesis argues that modernization breeds ethnic identica-
tion due to intensied competition over resources (Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983).4
If the classic view is correct, policies promoting modernization might be su¢ cient for attaining
shared national identity and good outcomes in conict and development, while if the competing
view is true, "nation-building" policies would be critical. Both views would contain some truth, but
which is more relevant under what conditions? How does modernization a¤ect social identity, ethnic
conict, and economic development? How do policies such as "nation-building" policies a¤ect the
outcomes? These questions would be very relevant to many ethnically-diverse developing countries.
1Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012), employing a specication based on Esteban and Ray (2011) and cross-country
data, nd that three indices of ethnic divisions, polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index, are
signicantly (positively for the rst two indices, negatively for the last one) related to conict. Miguel and Gugerty
(2005) show that fractionalization is negatively related to school funding and school infrastructure quality in two
districts of rural Kenya. Montalvo and Reynal-Quero (2005), using cross-country data, nd the evidence suggesting
that polarization has a negative e¤ect on economic growth through its negative e¤ect on investment and positive
e¤ects on government consumption and civil conict and fractionalization has a direct negative e¤ect on growth.
2Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2015) nd a positive relationship between identication with the nation and a
measure of state capacity in protecting property rights and a positive relationship between ethnic identication and
a measure of ine¢ ciency of legal system, based on Afrobarometer Surveys covering 18 20 Sub-Saharan nations.
3Miguel (2004) nds that two neighboring rural districts of Tanzania and Kenya, which largely shared geography,
history, and colonial institutional legacy, exhibit a sharp di¤erence in the relationship between ethnic diversity and
local provision of public goods (school funds and infrastructures), negative and signicant for the Kenyan district
and positive and insignicant for the Tanzanian district. He also nds that the relationship is insignicant for other
local public nance outcomes for Tanzania (no comparable data for Kenya). He argues that sharply di¤erent ethnic
policies in areas such as national language and public school education of post-independent governments contributed
to di¤erences in the strength of national identity and the above-mentioned relationship of the two countries.
4There is the third view focusing on Africa that also denies the traditional view based on much higher degrees of
ethnic diversity of African nations than European nations (Kedourie, 1970; Davidson, 1992). This view also stresses
important roles colonial legacy plays in todays social identity in Africa.
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In order to examine the questions theoretically, this paper develops a model of social identity,
ethnic conict, and economic development. In the model, which builds on the model of social
identication and ethnic conict by Sambanis and Shayo (2013), individuals choose a sector to
work (between the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic and
national identities), and contributions to conict. Thus, the degree of modernization (and output),
identity, and conict interact with each other.
Model: The analysis is based on a contest model (Hirshleifer, 1989; Garnkel, 1990; and
Skaperdas, 1992) in which multiple ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources. A nite number
of individuals belong to one of the ethnic groups that are symmetric in every aspect. So the model
is concerned with an ethnically heterogenous society without a dominant ethnic group.
There are multiple sectors producing the private good, ethnically-segregated traditional sectors
and the integrated modern sector. The traditional sectors correspond to sectors using traditional
or primitive technologies in the real economy, such as traditional agriculture, the urban informal
sector, and household production, and the modern sector corresponds to sectors using modern
technologies such as modern manufacturing and services, where the former sectors or activities
tend to be more ethnically segregated than the latter.5 Production technologies and factor markets
are congured so that the model can generate, in a simplest manner, the situation facing actual
developing countries that there are ine¢ ciently many workers in traditional sectors and their shift
to the modern sector raises aggregate output.6
The ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources that bring forth group-specic club goods,
such as public services and infrastructures beneting a specic group. (Main results are unchanged
when the contested resources yield the private good.) The proportion of the resources a particular
group acquires equals the relative level of contributions to conict by members of the group. The
cost of conict to an individual increases with the level of his contribution or "e¤orts", and, as in
standard contest models, the level of conict is measured by the total "e¤orts" in the society. The
resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the govern-
mental budget used for producing the group-specic goods. The model considers the situation in
which the resource allocation over the groups is determined not by rules but by the consequences
of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities).
As in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of an individual depends not only on (i) his
material payo¤, which is the wage minus the cost of conict plus the benet from the group-
specic club good, but also negatively on (iii) perceived distance from a social group he identies
with (his ethnic group or the nation) and positively on (iii) the status of the social group, which are
important factors a¤ecting social identication and intergroup behaviors, according to inuential
5Traditional agriculture is operated in largely ethnically homogenous rural communities and typical jobs in the
urban informal sector are neighborhood jobs in ethnically segregated communities.
6The production technology of the modern sector exhibits constant returns to its only input, labor, and the wage is
determined competitively, whereas, as in many existing works, that of traditional sectors exhibits decreasing returns
to labor and the wage is determined so that the product is equally shared among workers.
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theories in social psychology and empirical evidence.7 ;8 He perceives how close to or far from a
social group with the distance between his attributes and average attributes of the group. The
attributes are whether one belongs to (a) the nation or not, (b) particular ethnic groups or not,
and (c) particular traditional sectors or not. Following Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the weight
on the ethnic attributes (national attribute) in the distance is assumed to increase (decrease)
with the level of conict, which implies that, consistent with empirical evidence, when conict
becomes more intense, people care about ethnicity more (nationality less) in measuring distances
from social groups.9 The status of a social group is given by the exogenous di¤erence between the
groups "value" or "importance" and that of reference or comparison groups (other nations when
the group is the nation). The national status, for example, represents peoples evaluations of the
nations standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions
including culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (such as human rights and democracy)
as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory.
The utility function implies that, given that an individual identies with a particular social
group, his utility increases as the perceived distance from the group falls. Thus, he has an incentive
to choose actions lowering the distance. For example, since the distance depends on di¤erences in
the sectoral attributes, others things equal, he has an incentive to choose the same sector as the
"average person" of the group. However, social identication of an individual is not xed. He can
"choose" a group (his ethnic group or the nation) that brings him higher utility either because
of higher material payo¤, the shorter perceived distance, or the higher status. His identity might
change if exogenous variables a¤ecting his utility or choices by others alter. For example, as the
level of conict rises, people place a greater (smaller) weight on the ethnic attributes (national
attribute) in the perceived distance, which could change their identities.
Individuals play a two-stage game to maximize their utility. First, they decide which sector to
work, which determines labor incomes and sectoral and aggregate production. Then, they choose
a social group to identify with and a contribution to conict simultaneously, which determines the
level of conict, the allocation of the resources over the groups, and individual utilities.
Results: Equilibria can be classied into two types, those in which individuals of the same
ethnic group share the same identity and those they do not.10 There exist two homogenous identity
equilibria: the one in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group and the one in which all
7The concept of perceived distance is the basis of a major social psychological theory, self-categorization theory
(Turner et al., 1987). Intergroup status di¤erences are major factors a¤ecting intergroup behaviors such as conict
and discrimination, according to another inuential theory, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
8There is considerable evidence suggesting that perceived distance and status a¤ect social identity. For example,
Manning and Roy (2010) nd, for Great Britain, that nonwhite individuals, whose perceived distance from the nation
seems to be greater, are less likely to think of themselves as British than whites. Further, they nd that immigrants
from poorer and less democratic (that is, lower status) countries assimilate faster into British identity.
9Evidence suggests that peoples identities are a¤ected by the intensity of conict. For example, Rohner, Thoenig,
and Zilibotti (2013), using individual, county-level and district-level data from Uganda, nd that the proportion of
those identifying with their ethnic group over the nation is higher in counties of the higher intensity of armed conicts,
after controlling for individual, ethnic, and spatial characteristics and employing instrumental variable estimation.
10As mentioned above, ethnic groups are assumed to be symmetric in every aspect. Hence, the paper focuses on
equilibria in which choices of all groups are symmetric. Most of asymmetric equilibria are very di¢ cult to analyze.
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identify with the nation. And there exist three heterogenous identity equilibria: the one in which
those in the modern sector (traditional sectors) identify with the nation (their group); the one in
which those in the modern sector are divided over identities and all in traditional sectors identify
with their group; and the one in which those in traditional sectors are divided over identities
(and all in the modern sector identify with the nation): Thus, modern sector workers are more
(less) likely to identify with the nation (their ethnic group) than traditional sector workers. This
result is consistent with Robinson (2014), who, using individual-level survey data of sixteen African
countries, nds that being employed in the modern sector is signicantly and robustly associated
with identifying with the nation above their ethnic group, after controlling for education, urban
residence, gender, and various group-level and country-level variables.
When the equilibria are compared for given parameters and exogenous variables, it is found that
the level of conict is lower, the share of modern sector workers is higher, and, under conditions
that would hold for typical developing countries, total output of the private good and aggregate
material payo¤ (the value of private and club good consumption net of the cost of conict) are
higher, when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is higher. That is, national
identity is associated with not only the lower level of ethnic conict, which is shown in Sambanis
and Shayo (2013), but also the higher modern sector share and higher output.
Whereas all equilibria do exist for certain ranges of parameters and exogenous variables, the
set of equilibria typically changes with their values. Taking into account this, the paper analyzes
its focus, interactions among modernization, identity, conict and output. A simple dynamics
is introduced by supposing that one of exogenous variables, the (total factor) productivity of the
modern sector, increases over time. The productivity growth raises the modern sector wage, induces
the higher proportion of workers to choose the sector, and raises the sectors share in production.
How does such modernization of the economy a¤ect social identity, conict, and aggregate output?
If the national status is at extremes, the society stays in the same equilibrium: when the status
is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the nation (their ethnic group) and
the level of conict is consistently low (high): Otherwise, when the status is relatively high (low),
the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium, in which traditional sector
workers are more likely to identify with their ethnic group than modern sector workers, to the
one in which all workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict is
low (high). The sectoral shift of workers associated with modernization shakes prevailing social
identities in both sectors: modern sector workers become less attached to the national identity and
traditional sector workers become less attached to the ethnic identity. When the national status is
relatively high (low), the e¤ect on traditional (modern) sector workers determines the equilibrium
shift and all become identied with the nation (their group). Although increased productivity
always raises the modern sectors share in production and employment, given the productivity
level, the society with high (low) national status tends to be in an equilibrium characterized by
large (small) modern sector shares and, under conditions that would hold for typical developing
nations, high (low) aggregate output and material payo¤. That is, having su¢ ciently high national
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status is crucial in achieving universal national identity, a low level of conict, high modern sector
shares, and high aggregate output in the long run.
However, history or "luck" too is important, as long as the status is not at extremes. Given
parameters and exogenous variables including the status, multiple equilibria tend to exist and thus
identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized. Suppose that an
equilibrium realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods (if it continues to exist). Then, if
the initial equilibrium happens to be such that a relatively high proportion of individuals identify
with the nation, the society tends to be in an equilibrium with relatively strong national identity
and relatively good outcomes in other dimensions subsequently.
Similar results hold for contested resources too when "low (high) status" of the above result
is replaced with "large (small) amount of resources". Specically, given the status, when the
amount of contested resources is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium to the one in which all identify with their ethnic group (the nation). Note that
contested resources represent both material resources and a part of the governmental budget for
group-specic goods whose allocation over the groups is determined by the consequences of violent
or non-violent conict. Hence, the result suggests that the lack of strong political and economic
institutions as well as the abundance of material resources are hindrances to the good outcomes.
Further, an exogenous change making common nationality more salient (and ethnic di¤erences less
salient) in the perceived distance too has e¤ects similar to an increase in the status.
The results are consistent with the classic thesis on e¤ects of modernization on social identity
(Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Weber, 1979), if the national status is high, contested resources
are not abundant, institutions are good in quality, or common nationality is valued (and ethnic
di¤erences are not emphasized), otherwise, they are consistent with the competing thesis (Melson
and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983), as far as the relatively long term e¤ect (the e¤ect involving the
equilibrium shift) is concerned. Under the former condition, policies promoting modernization,
such as policies stimulating the technological progress of the modern sector and the construction
of transportation infrastructure connecting rural areas to urban areas, would be enough for the
good outcomes. By contrast, policies improving institutional quality, raising the national status,
or making shared nationality more salient (and ethnic di¤erences less salient) in peoples minds
are crucial under the latter condition. "Nation-building" policies, including the promotion of a
national language and school education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, may be
interpreted as policies raising the national status or making shared nationality more salient and thus
are critical under the condition. The model shows how "nation-building" policies, which Miguel
(2004) and Collier (2009) argue are e¤ective in strengthening national identity, can reinforce the
identity and bring better outcomes. There are empirical works suggesting negative e¤ects of natural
resources on civil conict and development and works suggesting important e¤ects of institutions
on civil conict, rent-seeking activities, and development. The model reveals a novel mechanism
interacting with social identity that resources and institutions a¤ect conict and development.
Related literature: This paper belongs to the literature examining issues on ethnic conicts
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using contest models. Recent contributions include Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011), Besley and
Persson (2010, 2011), Caselli and Coleman (2013), Sambanis and Shayo (2013), and Sambanis,
Skaperdas, and Wohlforth (2015). Most closely related is Sambanis and Shayo (2013), who develop
the rst formal model of social identication and ethnic conict using a utility function inspired
by theories in social psychology. This paper extends their model by modeling multiple production
sectors and associated sectoral choices by workers (and production decisions of rms), in order
to examine interactions among modernization, identity, conict, and output. Besley and Persson
(2010) also examines the relation between conict and development but in connection with capac-
ities of the state to raise revenue and provide services supporting markets. Sambanis, Skaperdas,
and Wohlforth (2015) present a model of interstate conict in which decisions of two countries to
go to war or not and the outcome depend on the expected e¤ect of victory on social identication
through the increased national status in one of the countries that are divided into two social groups
and in conict. Esteban and Ray (2008) develop a theory explaining the reason why ethnic con-
ict, rather than class conict, is salient, especially in societies with distinct economic inequalities.
Caselli and Coleman (2013) provide a theory of the salience of ethnic conict from a di¤erent
perspective. Besley and Persson (2011) examine conditions under which civil war and repression
by a group holding power on the opposition group occur. Esteban and Ray (2011) construct a
model that precisely connects the level of conict with three measures of ethnic divisions.
The paper also belongs to the theoretical literature examining interactions between identity and
economic or political behaviors, including Fearon and Laitin (2000), Akerlof and Kranton (2000,
2010), Shayo (2009), Benabou and Tirole (2011), Bisin et al. (2011), Eswaran and Neary (2014),
and Mele and Siegel (2016). Fearon and Laitin (2000) propose several mechanisms through which
social processes of ethnic identity construction a¤ect ethnic conict and assess the empirical validity
of di¤erent mechanisms by reviewing case studies. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) pioneer formally
modeling and examining e¤ects of identity on economic behaviors and Akerlof and Kranton (2010)
illustrate how various behaviors can be explained by their framework. Shayo (2009) constructs the
basic framework on which Sambanis and Shayo (2013) and this paper are based by generalizing
the framework of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and applies it to examine the political economy of
income redistribution. Benbou and Tirole (2011) develop a general model of identity management,
applicable to both personal and social identities, in which individuals who are uncertain about
self-concept make investment in identities, and provide explanations for wide-ranging empirical
puzzles. Bisin et al. (2011) develop a dynamic model of identity formation in which children
of a minority group receive an identity trait (either mainstream, i.e. accept the values of the
majority, or oppositional) from parents or role models and decide the intensity with which they
identify with the trait. Eswaran and Neary (2014) develop a model of decentralized terrorism in
which a perceived assault on social identity by out-groups motivates terrorist actions. Mele and
Siegel (2016) construct a model in which the majority-dominated states decision to repress the
minority and the latters decision to revolt interact with the minoritys identity choice of whether
to assimilate into or di¤erentiate from the majority.
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Finally, the paper is also related to the literature that theoretically examines the modernization
of an economy, such as Lewis (1954), Banerjee and Newman (1998), Proto (2007), Vollrath (2009),
and Yuki (2007, 2008, 2016). In order to examine interactions among modernization, conict, and
social identication with a tractable model, this paper models the ine¢ cient sectoral allocation
of workers in a simplest manner and considers modernization induced by exogenous productivity
growth. By contrast, these papers model factors leading to the ine¢ cient allocation more explicitly
and examine economic mechanisms of modernization more in detail.
Organization of the paper: Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 presents and dis-
cusses results. In particular, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 examine homogenous and heterogeneous identity
equilibria respectively, Section 3.3 analyzes interactions among modernization, identity, conict,
and output, and Section 3.4 analyzes e¤ects of resources on the interactions. Section 4 concludes.
Appendix A presents existence conditions for equilibria, and Appendix B contains proofs.
2 Model
Consider a contest model (Hirshleifer, 1989; Garnkel, 1990; and Skaperdas, 1992) in which ne( 2)
ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources. The society is populated by a nite number N of
individuals who belong to one of the ethnic groups that are symmetric in every aspect (thus the
population size of each group is N=ne). So the model is concerned with an ethnically heterogenous
society without a dominant ethnic group.
Production: There are ne + 1 sectors producing the private good, ne ethnically-segregated
traditional sectors (sectors TJ , J = 1; 2; :::; ne) and one ethnically-integrated modern sector (sector
M). The traditional sectors correspond to sectors using traditional or primitive technologies in the
real economy, such as traditional agriculture, the urban informal sector, and household production,
and the modern sector corresponds to sectors using modern technologies such as modern manufac-
turing and services,11 where the former sectors or activities tend to be more ethnically segregated
than the latter: traditional agriculture is operated in largely ethnically homogenous rural commu-
nities and typical jobs in the urban informal sector are neighborhood jobs in ethnically segregated
communities.
The production functions of sectors TJ (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) and M are
YTJ = AT (LTJ)
;  2 (0; 1); (1)
YM = AM
neP
J=1
LMJ ; (2)
where LTJ and AT are respectively the number of workers in sector TJ and the sectors total factor
11The urban informal sector is a part of the urban economy composed of small-scale businesses supplying basic
services (for example, small shops and vendors selling commodities and meals) and basic manufacturing goods.
Even today, sectors or production activities using traditional technologies is important in most developing nations.
Although urbanization lowered the share of agricultural employment signicantly, it did not raise the share of sectors
using modern technologies greatly in many countries. According to OECD (2009), informal employment, dened as
the sum of urban informal-sector employment and formal-sector one without social protection (such as social security
benets) accounts for the majority of non-agricultural employment in developing nations.
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productivity (TFP), LMJ is the number of workers of ethnic group J in sector M; and AM is the
sectors TFP. (Each worker supplies a unit of labor inelastically.) Sector TJ exhibits decreasing
returns to labor, which intends to capture the fact that labor productivity tends to fall with the
amount of labor input in traditional sectors due to limited arable land (traditional agriculture),
limited capital available to credit constrained producers (the urban informal sector), or a decreasing
degree of task specialization of each family member (household production).12
The wage rate is determined competitively in sector M: By contrast, in sector TJ , as in Lewis
(1954) and many subsequent works modeling traditional sectors, labor income is determined so
that the product is equally shared among workers.13 Thus, labor incomes in the sectors are
yTJ = AT (LTJ)
 1; (3)
yM = AM : (4)
This setting can generate, in a simplest manner, the situation facing actual developing countries
that there are ine¢ ciently many workers in traditional sectors and their shift to the modern sector
raises aggregate output.14
Conict: The ethnic groups contest for exogenous resources that bring forth group-specic
club goods of value V , such as public services and infrastructures beneting a particular group.
(Main results are unchanged when the contested resources yield the private good.15) The amount
of resources each group acquires depends on contributions to the conict by individuals of each
group. In particular, the contested resources are divided among the groups according to the
following contest function,
VJ
V
=
FJ
F
if F > 0; and =
1
ne
if F = 0; (5)
where VJ is the resources acquired by group J(J = 1; 2; :::; ne), FJ =
P
i2J fi is the total contribu-
tions or "e¤orts" by members of the group (fi is the contribution by individual i), and F =
neP
J=1
FJ
is the aggregate "e¤orts" of the society, which is called the level of conict.16 The contested
resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the govern-
mental budget used for producing the group-specic goods.17 The model considers the situation in
12This is because the number of tasks performed by each family member increases, as more production activities
shift from the market to the household and thus the labor input in household production increases.
13This assumption reects the fact that typical production units of traditional sectors are family-run farms/rms
or households. Qualitative results below do not depend on this, except results on total output of the private good.
14 In the real economy, there are other factors causing the ine¢ cient allocation of workers, including inadequate
access to quality education required in many modern sector jobs and inadequate access to capital to start a business
in the sector. To make the model analytically tractable, these factors are not modeled but would not a¤ect results.
15The assumption that the resources yield group-specic club goods justies more naturally the setting that conict
arises among ethnic groups. However, theories by Esteban and Ray (2008) and Caselli and Coleman (2013) provide
explanations for the salience of ethnic conict in the real society even when groups contest for private goods.
16As may be inferred from the setting, conict always occurs in equilibrium. The paper does not examine the
question of why costly and sometimes destructive conict ever occurs at all, on which the literature provides informa-
tional asymmetries and commitment problems as major explanations (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, for a review.)
Rather, it is interested in how the level of conict interacts with social identity and modernization, among others.
17To be more exact, when the contested resources represent the governmental budget for the club goods, taxation
8
which the resource allocation over the groups is determined not by rules but by the consequences
of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities), in which force, mass
demonstrations, bribery, or lobbying are employed to inuence the outcome.
Individual i contributing fi to the conict incurs a cost of c(fi), which, following Esteban and
Ray (2011), takes the following form:
c(fi) =
1

(fi)
;   2: (6)
The restriction   2 is needed to prove some results ( > 1 is enough for most results).
Utility: As in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of an individual depends not only
on his material payo¤ positively, but also negatively on perceived distance from a social group he
identies with (either his ethnic group or the nation) and positively on the status of the social group,
which are important factors a¤ecting social identication and intergroup behaviors, according to
inuential theories in social psychology (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987) and empirical
evidence (Manning and Roy, 2010; Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth, 2015).18
The material payo¤ of individual i of ethnic group J (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) when he works in sector
K (K = TJ;M) is
i = yK   1

(fi)
 + 
FJ
F
V; (7)
where  is the value of the group-specic club good in units of the private good.
Social groups are groups from which an individual chooses one group he identies with, which
are, as in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), his ethnic group and the nation N . That is, the set of social
groups for individuals of ethnic group J is fJ;Ng:
Individual i who is characterized by three types of attributes perceives how close to or far from
a social group with the distance between his attributes and average attributes of the group. The
attributes are whether one belongs to (a) the nation or not, (b) particular ethnic groups or not,
and (c) particular traditional sectors or not:
qni = 1 if i 2 N; qni = 0 otherwise, (8)
qJi = 1 if i 2 J; qJi = 0 otherwise, for J = 1; 2; ::; ne; (9)
qTJi = 1 if i 2 TJ; qTJi = 0 otherwise, for J = 1; 2; ::; ne: (10)
For example, when he belongs to ethnic group 2 and works in sector M , qni = 1; q
2
i = 1; q
J
i = 0
for J 6= 2; and qTJi = 0 for any J: The national and ethnic attributes are xed, while the sectoral
should be modeled. If the government is assumed to impose lump-sum tax of the same amount on all individuals,
none of results are a¤ected. The only change is that disposable incomes of individuals decrease by the tax amount.
18There is considerable evidence suggesting that perceived distance and status a¤ect social identity. For example,
Manning and Roy (2010) nd, for Great Britain, that nonwhites, whose perceived distance from the "average" person
in the nation seems to be greater, are less likely to think of themselves as British than whites. Further, they nd
that immigrants from poorer and less democratic (that is, lower status) countries assimilate faster into a British
identity. Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth (2015) present episodes suggesting that interstate wars a¤ect social
identity through the national status, including increased identication with the state after victory in the WWII in
the USSR and the intensication of a common identity among southern Slavs, including Croats and Slovenes, after
Serbian victories against the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars in 1912 13.
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attributes are determined endogenously by sectoral choices of workers, which are described later.
The perceived distance between individual i and social group G (G = J;N), on which his utility
depends negatively, is represented by19
diG
2 = !n(q
n
i  qnG)2 + !e
neP
J=1
(qJi  qJG)2 + !s
neP
J=1
(qTJi  qTJG )2; (11)
where qnG; q
J
G; and q
TJ
G are average values of the three attributes of the group, and !n; !e; !s 2 (0; 1)
are weights on the respective attributes and their sum equals 1.
Following Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the weight on the ethnic attributes !e (the national
attribute !n) is assumed to increase (decrease) with the level of ethnic conict F :20
!e = 0+1F; 0  0; 1 > 0; 0+1Fmax < 1 !s; (12)
!n = 1 !e !s = 1 !s (0+1F); (13)
where Fmax is the maximum possible level of F , whose value is determined later. The specication
implies that, when ethnic conict becomes more intense, people care about the ethnic attributes
more (the national attribute less) in measuring distances from social groups, which is consistent
with empirical evidence (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2013;
Sambanis and Shayo, 2013).21
The utility of an individual also depends positively on the status of social group G (G = J;N)
he identies with, which is given by the di¤erence between peoples evaluations of the groups
"value" or "importance" and the reference groupsone:22
SG = G    G; (14)
where exogenous G and  G summarize all factors a¤ecting the groups and the reference or
comparison groupsabsolute "value" or "importance". When G = J; the reference group is the
other ethnic groups, and when G = N; it is other nations. Since the ethnic groups are assumed to
19The concept of perceived distance is developed in cognitive psychology in studying how a person categorizes
information that comes in to her (stimuli) (Nosofsky, 1986). Turner et al. (1987) apply the concept to the catego-
rization by a person of people, including herself, into social groups, in constructing an inuential social psychological
theory, self-categorization theory. The theory tries to explain psychological basis of social identication.
20The weight on the sectoral attributes, !s; is assumed to be independent of F; because it is not clear how !s is
a¤ected by the intensity of ethnic conicts: if most people are in ethnically-segregated traditional sectors, !s might
increase with F , while if most are in the integrated modern sector, !s might decrease with F .
21There is evidence suggesting that social identities of individuals are a¤ected by the intensity of conict. A case
analysis of the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s by Sambanis and Shayo (2013) cites evidence showing that the
share of people identifying themselves as Yugoslavs dropped greatly after the intensication of the conict and
episodes suggesting the lack of strong ethnic identities before the war. Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013), using
individual, county-level and district-level data from Uganda, nd that the proportion of individuals identifying with
their ethnic group over the nation is higher in counties of the higher intensity of armed conicts, after controlling
for individual, ethnic, and spatial characteristics and employing instrumental variable estimation. Further, Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner (2010), based on 22 public opinion surveys in 10 African countries, nd that being close to a
competitive presidential election is positively associated with ethnic identication.
22 Intergroup status di¤erences are major factors a¤ecting intergroup behaviors such as conict and discrimination,
according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), an inuential social psychological theory closely related
to self-categorization theory (footnote 19; see Turner and Reynolds, 2001, for example, for similarities and di¤erences
of the two theories), which tries to explain collective behaviors mainly based on social identity.
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be symmetric, SJ = J    J = 0; while SN = N    N is generally non-zero.23
The exogenous national status SN represents peoples evaluations of the nations international
standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions such
as culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (for example, human rights and democracy)
as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. In order to simplify the
analysis greatly, unlike Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the status does not depend on the groups
total material payo¤s (the sum of i) and thus is exogenous. Results would not be a¤ected by
taking into account the economic status, as long as its importance in the utility is not very large.
From these settings, as in Sambanis and Shayo (2013), the utility of individual i who identies
with social group G is given by
uiG = i   diG2 + SG; ;  > 0: (15)
The utility function implies that, given that an individual identies with a particular social
group, his utility increases as the perceived distance from the group falls. Thus, he has an incentive
to choose actions lowering the distance. For example, since the perceived distance depends on
di¤erences in the sectoral attributes, others things equal, he has an incentive to choose the same
sector as the "average person" of the group.
Social identication of an individual, that is, which group he identies with, is not xed. He
can "choose" a group (his ethnic group or the nation) that brings him higher utility either because
of higher material payo¤, the shorter perceived distance, or the higher status. His social identity
might change if exogenous variables a¤ecting his utility directly or indirectly through choices by
others alter. For example, as the level of conict rises, people place a greater weight on the ethnic
attributes and a smaller weight on the national attribute in the perceived distance, which could
change their social identities. Exact timing of their decisions is as follows.
Timing: Individuals play a two-stage game to maximize their utility. First, they decide
which sector to work (sector TJ or sector M for individuals of ethnic group J), which in turn
determines labor incomes in traditional sectors (yTJ) and sectoral and aggregate output (YTJ ; YM ;
and Y  YTJ + YM ). Then, that is, after LTJ and LMJ are determined, they choose a social group
to identify with and the contribution to conict fi simultaneously, which determines the level of
conict F , the allocation of the contested resources V over the groups, and individual utilities.24
The solution concept applied is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, thus the two-stage game
can be solved by backward induction.25
23The assumption on reference groups is made for simplicity. If reference groups of the nation include ethnic groups
and vice versa, SN = N   [ N + (1  )J ] ( 2 [0; 1]) and SJ = J   [ J + (1  )N ] = (1   )(J   N ):
Results in Section 3 remain the same if "SN" is replaced with "SN   SJ"(= (2   )N    N   2(1   )J ) in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 (and Appendix A).
24The timing of events reects the fact that the choice between the two sectors made earlier in life largely determines
the sector to work for most of life (because, in the real economy, the sectors tend to require di¤erent levels of education
and di¤erent types of skills and be located in di¤erent places), while social identity is more likely to change over
time, usually gradually (see footnote 18 for the evidence on immigrants), but sometimes in a short period of time
triggered by events such as armed conict and electoral competition (see footnote 21 for the evidence).
25Sambanis and Shayo (2013) apply the concept of the social identity equilibrium to their one-shot game. The
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3 Results
There exist many subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the game, including ones in which di¤erent
ethnic groups make di¤erent choices, which are generally di¢ cult to analyze. Hence, the paper
focuses on equilibria in which choices of all ethnic groups are symmetric. These equilibria can
be classied into two types, equilibria in which individuals of the same ethnic group share the
same identity and those in which they have di¤erent identities. For ease of exposition, homogenous
identity equilibria are analyzed rst (Section 3.1), then heterogenous identity equilibria are analyzed
and compared with homogenous identity equilibria (Section 3.2). These sections compare di¤erent
equilibria for given parameters and exogenous variables, but which equilibrium(a) exists do change
with values of exogenous variables. Taking into account this, Section 3.3 analyzes the main focus
of the paper, interactions among modernization (the shift from traditional sectors to the modern
sector), identity, conict, and output. And Section 3.4 examines how the abundance of contested
resources a¤ects the interactions.
In order to simplify the analysis, the following assumption, which is a su¢ cient condition for
fi > 0 and thus F > 0 to hold in all equilibria, is imposed.
Assumption 1: 
V
N
> (1)

 1

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
: (16)
3.1 Homogenous identity equilibria
There exist two homogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which all individuals identify
with their ethnic group and the one in which all individuals identify with the nation. The former
is examined rst.
3.1.1 All individuals identify with their ethnic group
Consider the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers (LTJ and LMJ) are
given. When individual i of ethnic group J (J = 1; 2; :::; ne) in sector M identies with his ethnic
group, he chooses the contribution to conict fi to maximize the following utility (note qni =q
n
J =1;
qJi =q
J
J =1; q
k
i =0 for k 6= n; J; qTJJ = LTJN=ne , and qkJ = 0 for k 6= n; J; TJ):
AM  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  !s

LTJ
N=ne
2
: (17)
From the rst-order condition,
fi=fi;e


F J
F 2
V
 1
 1
; where F JF FJ : (18)
When he is in sector TJ instead, he chooses fi to maximize (qTJi = 1)
equilibrium is similar to the standard Nash equilibrium but the condition on the choice of identities is weaker. In
this paper, the concept of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is used, because it is familiar and it seems to be
easier to apply. Shayo (2009) too employs the standard Nash equilibrium to solve a one-shot game of social identity.
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AT (LTJ)
 1  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  !s

1  LTJ
N=ne
2
: (19)
The solution for fi is given by (18) as in the previous case.
Since all individuals identify with their ethnic group and the ethnic groups are symmetric, by
substituting F J = ne 1ne F and fi = F=N into (18), the equilibrium level of conict F

e is obtained:
F e =


ne 1
ne
V
N
1

N from F e =


ne 1
ne
V
F e
 1
 1
N: (20)
In the rst stage, individuals choose production sectors taking into account e¤ects of their
choices on the second stage. Assume that the following condition holds so that LTJ = Nne (all
individuals choose sector TJ) does not hold in equilibrium.26
Assumption 2: AT

N
ne
 1
+!s<AM : (21)
Then, the sectoral allocation of workers is determined so that choosing either sector is indi¤er-
ent. From (17) and (19), the indi¤erence condition is
AT (LTJ)
 1 !s

1 2neLTJ
N

=AM ; (22)
which gives the unique solution (LTJ)e 2(0; Nne ) that decreases with AM and increases with AT :27
3.1.2 All individuals identify with the nation
Consider the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers are given. When
individual i of ethnic group J in sector M identies with the nation, he chooses fi to maximize
the following utility (note !e=0+1F , SN = N  N ; qJN = 1ne ; qTKN =
LTK
N for any TK):
AM  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  
(
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s
"
LTJ
N
2
+
P
K6=J

LTK
N
2#)
+SN : (23)
From the rst-order condition (fi>0 from the assumption (16)),
fi=fi;n


F J
F 2
V  1ne 1
ne
 1
 1
; where F JF FJ : (24)
When he is in sector TJ instead, he chooses fi to maximize
AT (LTJ)
 1  1

(fi)
+
FJ
F
V  
(
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s
"
1 LTJ
N
2
+
P
K6=J

LTK
N
2#)
+SN ; (25)
26This assumption also eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibrium values of LTJ for the given social identity
equilibrium, which arises without the assumption if the e¤ect of the perceived distance on sectoral choices is large.
27The rst derivative with respect to LTJ of the LHS of (22) is  (1 )AT (LTJ) 2+!s 2neN ; which equals  1 at
LTJ = 0 and equals 0 at LTJ =

(1 )AT
!s
2ne
N
 1
2 
; and the second derivative equals (2 )(1 )AT (LTJ) 3 > 0: Thus,
from (21) and the fact that the LHS of (22) at LTJ = 0 equals +1, there exists unique LTJ 2(0; Nne ) satisfying (22):
The relations of (LTJ)e with AM and AT are straightforward from the shape of the LHS of (22).
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whose solution is given by (24) as in the previous case.
Since all individuals identify with the nation and the groups are symmetric, by plugging F J =
ne 1
ne
F and fi = F=N into (24), the equilibrium level of conict F n is obtained as a solution for
F n=

ne 1
ne


V
F n
 1
 1
 1
N: (26)
In the rst stage, the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices equals, from (23) and (25),
AT (LTJ)
 1 !s

1 2LTJ
N

= AM ; (27)
which gives the unique solution (LTJ)n 2 (0; (LTJ)e) that decreases with AM and increases with
AT :
28
3.1.3 Analysis
The following proposition compares the two homogenous identity equilibria for given parameters
and exogenous variables in terms of the level of conict, the sectoral distribution of individuals,
and output of the private good. As explained in Section 3.3 and detailed in Appendix A, there do
exist combinations of parameters and exogenous variables such that both equilibria exist.
Proposition 1 Given parameters and exogenous variables, the following holds for two homogenous
identity equilibria.
(i) The level of conict is lower when all identify with the nation, i.e. F n < F e :
(ii) LTJ and thus the proportion of workers in traditional sectors are lower when all identify with
the nation, i.e. (LTJ)n < (LTJ)e.
(iii) Total output of the private good Y is higher under the national identity, if  (the parameter of
the traditional sector production function) is below a certain level or if AM is not very high (or
AT is not very low). The output is higher under the ethnic identity if  is above a certain level
(higher than the previous threshold) and AM is high (or AT is low) enough.
Individuals contribute less to conict and thus the level of conict F is lower when they identify
with the nation, because they take into account the undesirable e¤ect of the conict on the perceived
distance from the "average member" of the nation, in choosing fi: higher F raises the weight on
ethnicity, !e; and lowers the weight on nationality, !n; thereby highlighting di¤erences among
members and raising the distance. The same result is shown in Sambanis and Shayo (2013) and is
consistent with empirical evidence such as Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) and Rohner, Thoenig,
and Zilibotti (2013) (see footnote 21).
What is new is the e¤ect on the sectoral distribution of individuals and total output. Given
parameters and exogenous variables, LTJ and thus the proportion of workers in traditional sectors
are lower when they identify with the nation. Under the national identity, the utility when they
28From the comparison of the LHS of (27) with that of (22) and the discussion in footnote 27, it is clear that,
when (21) is assumed, the unique solution (LTJ)n 2(0; (LTJ)e) that decreases with AM and increases with AT exists.
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choose the traditional sector of their ethnic group is lower for given LTJ and thus the smaller
proportion of them choose the sector. This is because the perceived distance from the "average
national" rises by choosing the ethnically segregated sector over the integrated modern sector under
the national identity, whereas, under the ethnic identity, the perceived distance from the "average
member" of the ethnic group falls (if LTJ > N2ne ; i.e., the majority is in the traditional sector) or
rises less (if LTJ < N2ne ) by choosing the sector.
In this model, the sectoral allocation of workers is generally ine¢ cient, i.e. it does not maximize
total output of the private good, because labor income equals the average labor productivity, not
the marginal productivity, in traditional sectors (note,  < 1, decreasing returns to labor in the
sectors) and the perceived distance term in the utility function distorts sectoral choices by inducing
workers to choose the same sector as the "average person" of the group they identify with. The
former leads to too many traditional sector workers, while the latter leads to too few workers in
the sectors under the national identity and to too many (few) workers in the sectors under the
ethnic identity when LTJ >(<) N2ne .
If  is below a certain level, the rst e¤ect dominates and LTJ is higher than the e¢ cient level.
In this case, total output is higher under the national identity because LTJ is smaller than under
the ethnic identity and thus closer to the e¢ cient level. The condition would be more relevant to
developing nations, since low  implies strong decreasing returns in traditional sectors.29 The same
result holds for any ; if AM is not very high (or AT is not very low) and thus LTJ is not small
so that the second e¤ect under the ethnic identity is positive (leads to too high LTJ) or negative
but small. As shown in the proof, this is the case when more than a quarter of workers choose
traditional sectors under the national identity, but it could be true with a much smaller proportion
in the sectors. The condition seems to hold in typical developing countries, considering the fact
that the majority work in the sectors (see footnote 11).30
To summarize, national identity is associated with not only the lower level of conict but also
the higher share of modern sector workers and, under conditions that would hold at least for typical
developing countries, higher levels of total output of the private good and of aggregate material
payo¤ (the value of private and club good consumption net of the cost of conict). Note that
the result on output and material payo¤ holds despite the model does not assume the plausible
negative e¤ect of conict on the modern sector productivity (relative to the traditional sector one),
due to the e¤ect of the perceived distance on sectoral choices. The result would be strengthened if
such e¤ect is considered.31
29Remember that the decreasing returns to labor intends to capture the fact that labor productivity tends to fall
with the amount of labor input in the sectors due to limited arable land (traditional agriculture), limited capital
available to credit constrained producers (the urban informal sector), or a decreasing degree of task specialization of
each family member (household production). These factors are important in developing countries (footnote 11).
30By contrast, Y is lower under the national identity, if  is above a critical level (higher than the previous one)
and AM is high (or AT is low) enough that LTJ < N2ne , because the negative second e¤ect dominates and thus LTJ
is lower than the e¢ cient level in both equilibria. However, even in this case, unless Y is much lower, aggregate
material payo¤ would be higher under the national identity because of the lower cost of conict.
31The easiest way to include this e¤ect is to assume that AM (F); A0M (F) < 0; and individuals do not consider e¤ects
of their actions on AM (F) in making decisions. Then, only the indi¤erence conditions for sectoral choices change.
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3.2 Heterogenous identity equilibria
Now, equilibria in which individuals of the same ethnic group have di¤erent identities are examined.
There exist three heterogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which sector M (sector TJ)
workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group), the one in which those in sector M are
divided over identities and all in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, and the one in which
those in sector TJ are divided over identities (and all in sector M identify with the nation):
3.2.1 Sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group and sector M workers iden-
tify with the nation
In the second stage of the game in which sectoral allocation of workers are given, workers in sector
TJ identifying with their ethnic group choose fi to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18),
while those in sector M identifying with the nation choose fi to maximize (23) and the solution is
given by (24).
Because the ethnic groups are symmetric, by substituting F J = ne 1ne F into (18) and (24), and
plugging them into F = fi;eneLTJ+fi;n(N neLTJ), the level of conict F given LTJ is obtained:
F =

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
"

V
F
 1
 1
neLTJ+


V
F
 1
 1
 1
(N neLTJ)
#
; (28)
which increases with LTJ and is denoted by Fd(LTJ) (d is for "divided identities"):
In the rst stage, the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices equals, from (18), (19), (23),
(24), and (28),
AT (LTJ)
 1  1

 ne 1ne
V
Fd(LTJ)
 
 1 !s

1  LTJN=ne
2
=AM  1
h
ne 1
ne

 VFd(LTJ) 1
i 
 1 

[0+1Fd(LTJ)]
ne 1
ne
+!sne

LTJ
N
2
+SN
, AT (LTJ) 1+

[0+1Fd(LTJ)]
ne 1
ne
+!s

ne

LTJ
N
2 1 ne LTJN 2
 1

ne 1
ne
 
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 
 1 

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 
 1

 SN =AM ; (29)
which gives solution (LTJ)d2(0; Nne ): Appendix B proves its uniqueness when  = 2:32 The equilib-
rium level of conict, F d ; is obtained from the substitution of (LTJ)

d into (28).
3.2.2 Those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ identify with
their ethnic group
In the second stage of the game, workers in sector TJ identifying with their ethnic group choose fi
to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18), while those in sector M are indi¤erent between
identifying with the nation, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (23) and the solution is given
32When  > 2; the uniqueness of (LTJ)d cannot be proved, but whether (LTJ)

d is unique or not does not a¤ect
results below.
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by (24), and identifying with their ethnic group, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (17) and
the solution is given by (18).
Thus, the indi¤erence condition for identity choices when ethnic groups are symmetric is
AM  1 (fi;e)+ FJF V  !s

LTJ
N=ne
2
= AM  1 (fi;n)+ FJF V  

(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!sne

LTJ
N
2
+SN (30)
, 

(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  1  1=SN ; (31)
where F satises
F =fi;nPM;n (N neLTJ)+fi;e [neLTJ+(1 PM;n)(N neLTJ)]
=

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1PM;n (N neLTJ)+
 
 VF
 1
 1 [neLTJ+(1 PM;n)(N neLTJ)]

; (32)
where PM;n is the proportion of sector M workers identifying with the nation. Since the LHS of
(31) decreases with LTJ and increases with F , F satisfying (31) increases with LTJ .
The indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices in the rst stage is given by (22) and thus the
same as the equilibrium in which all identify with their ethnic group from (19) and (30). Thus,
the equilibrium level of LTJ , (LTJ)Md; equals (LTJ)

e, and the equilibrium level of conict F

Md is
obtained by substituting (LTJ)e into (31) and solving it for F .
3.2.3 Those in sector TJ are divided over identities and all in sectors M identify with
the nation
In the second stage, those in sector M identifying with the nation choose fi to maximize (23) and
the solution is (24), while those in sector TJ are indi¤erent between identifying with the nation,
in which case fi is chosen to maximize (25) and the solution is given by (24), and identifying with
their ethnic group, in which case fi is chosen to maximize (19) and the solution is given by (18).
Thus, the indi¤erence condition for identity choices when ethnic groups are symmetric is
AT (LTJ)
 1  1 (fi;e)+ FJF V  !s

1  LTJN=ne
2
= AT (LTJ)
 1  1 (fi;n)+ FJF V  

!e
ne 1
ne
+!s

1  LTJN
2
+(ne 1)

LTK
N
2
+SN (33)
, 
h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1
 
 VF
 
 1   VF  1  1 = SN ; (34)
where F satises
F =fi;n [PTJ;nneLTJ+(N neLTJ)]+fi;e (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ
=

ne 1
ne
 1
 1
 
 VF  1
 1
 1 [PTJ;nneLTJ+(N neLTJ)]+
 
 VF
 1
 1 (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ

; (35)
where PTJ;n is the proportion of sector TJ workers identifying with the nation. F satisfying
(34) decreases with LTJ because the LHS of (34) increases with LTJ and F . After the negative
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dependence of F on LTJ is taken into account, PTJ;n increases with LTJ from (35).
The indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices in the rst stage is given by (27) and thus the same
as the equilibrium in which all identify with the nation from (23) and (33). The equilibrium level
of LTJ , (LTJ)Td; equals (LTJ)

n, and the equilibrium level of conict F

Td is obtained by substituting
(LTJ)

n into (34) and solving it for F .
3.2.4 Analysis
In all the heterogenous identity equilibria, modern sector workers are more (less) likely to identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) than traditional sector workers: when some workers in tradi-
tional sectors identify with the nation, all in the modern sector do (and when some in the modern
sector identify with their ethnic group, all in traditional sectors do).33 This is because the modern
sector is ethnically integrated (and traditional sectors are ethnically segregated) and thus the per-
ceived distance of modern sector workers from the "average national" is smaller than the distance
from the "average member" of their ethnic group and the opposite holds for traditional sector
workers, if only sectoral attributes are considered.34 The result is consistent with Robinson (2014),
who, using individual-level survey data of sixteen African countries, nds that being employed in
the modern sector is signicantly and robustly associated with identifying with the nation above
their ethnic group, after controlling for education, urban residence, gender, and group-level and
country-level variables.35 ;36
The following proposition compares the heterogenous identity equilibria, together with the
homogenous identity equilibria, in terms of the level of conict, the sectoral distribution of workers,
and output of the private good, for given parameters and exogenous variables. There do exist
combinations of parameters and exogenous variables such that multiple or even all equilibria exist,
as explained in Section 3.3 and detailed in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 Given parameters and exogenous variables, the following holds when three heteroge-
nous identity equilibria, together with two homogenous identity equilibria, are compared.
(i) The level of conict is lower when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is
higher, i.e. F n < F Td < F

d < F

Md < F

e :
(ii) (LTJ)

Td = (LTJ)

n < (LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e:
33That there do not exist equilibria in which individuals in the modern sector are less likely to identify with the
nation than those in traditional sectors is formally shown in the proof of Proposition A2 of Appendix A.
34The total perceived distance of modern sector workers from the "average national" could be greater than the
distance from the "average member" of their ethnic group, because ethnic attributes contribute to raising the distance
from the "average national". By contrast, the total perceived distance of traditional sector workers from the "average
national" is always greater than the distance from the "average member" of their ethnic group.
35Robinson (2014) classify workers into the formal and informal sectors based on their occupation: formal sector
occupations are military/police, clerical worker, business person, professional worker, civil servant, teacher, etc., and
informal sector occupations are subsistence farmer, informal manual labor, herder, housewife, etc.
36By contrast, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), based on 22 public opinion surveys in 10 African countries, nd
that being a farmer or sherman, whom they classify as traditional sector workers, is negatively correlated with the
ethnic identity. However, there is no option for the national identity in the surveys (other options are religious and
class/occupational identities) and, unlike this paper and Robinson (2014), they classify those in the urban informal
sector as formal sector workers.
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(iii) Y Td = Y

n > Y

d > Y

Md = Y

e if  is below a certain level or if AM is not very high (or AT is
not very low). The relation is opposite if  is above a certain level (larger than the previous
threshold) and AM is high (or AT is low) enough.
The level of conict is lower when the proportion of individuals identifying with the nation is
higher. That is, among the heterogenous identity equilibria, the equilibrium in which all sector M
workers identify with the nation and sector TJ workers are divided over identities has the lowest
conict level, the one in which sector M workers are divided over identities and all in sector TJ
identify with their ethnic group has the highest level, and the one in which sector M (sector TJ)
workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group) has the intermediate level. Among all the
equilibria, the two homogenous identity equilibria have the highest and the lowest conict levels.
Roughly speaking, individuals identifying with the nation contribute less to conict because,
as explained after Proposition 1, in choosing fi, they take into account that higher F raises the
perceived distance from the "average national" by highlighting di¤erences among ethnic groups.
The above explanation presumes that, among the heterogenous identity equilibria, the pro-
portion of individuals identifying with the nation is highest when those in sector TJ are divided
over identities (and all in sector M identify with the nation) and lowest when those in sector M
are divided over identities (and all in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group). The result on
the fraction of workers in traditional sectors, (LTJ)Td = (LTJ)

n < (LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e, con-
rms that this is the case. (LTJ)n < (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e holds because, in the heterogenous identity
equilibrium, the proportion of those identifying with the nation, who gain less from choosing the
traditional sector of their ethnic group, is higher (lower) than in the equilibrium in which all share
the ethnic (national) identity. (LTJ)Td = (LTJ)

n and (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e hold for the remaining het-
erogenous identity equilibria, because individuals who share the same identity are in both sectors
(the national identity for the former case and the ethnic identity for the latter) and thus they must
be indi¤erent between the sectors as in the corresponding homogenous identity equilibrium.
Finally, the result on total output of the nal good is similar to Proposition 1 and can be
explained as before. The discussion on the result after Proposition 1 suggests that, for typical
developing economies, total output is generally higher as the proportion of individuals having the
national identity is higher, although Y Td = Y

n and Y

Md = Y

e are true. Further, the aggregate
material payo¤ is strictly higher when the proportion of those identifying with the nation is higher
because of the lower cost of conict.37
To summarize, the results for homogenous identity equilibria in Proposition 1 continue to hold
when heterogenous identity equilibria too are considered: national identity is associated with not
only the lower level of conict but also the higher share of modern sector workers and, under
conditions that would hold at least for typical developing countries, higher levels of total output of
37The total cost of conict is (Nn and Ne are respectively numbers of those identifying with the nation and their
ethnic group) 1


(fi;n)
Nn +(fi;e)
Ne

= 1


(fi;n)
 1fi;nNn+(fi;e) 1fi;eNe

= 1

ne 1
ne
 
 V
F
 1

fi;nNn+
V
F
fi;eNe

=
1

ne 1
ne
[V  1fi;nNn] ; where the second equality is from the rst order conditions of utility maximization and
F J = ne 1ne F: The total cost decreases with Nn since fi;n increases with Nn from (24) and Proposition 2.
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the private good and of aggregate material payo¤ (the value of private and club good consumption
net of the cost of conict). The results are consistent with the often-made argument (Collier,
2009; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015) that the lack of shared social identity, that is, the
dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic) identities over national identity, lies behind poor
performance in various dimensions, including conict and economic development, in ethnically
heterogenous societies.
3.3 Interactions among modernization, identity, conict and output
The previous sections compared di¤erent equilibria for given parameters and exogenous variables,
but which equilibrium(a) exists changes with values of exogenous variables, as examined in detail
in Appendix A. Taking into account this result, this section analyzes the focus of the paper,
interactions among modernization, identity, conict and output.
A simple dynamics is introduced into the model by supposing that the TFP (total factor pro-
ductivity) of sector M , AM ; increases over time. In the real economy, the TFP growth corresponds
to the technological progress of the modern sector and the improvement in quality of institutions
supporting the sectors economic activities. The productivity growth raises the modern sector in-
come, induces the higher proportion of workers to choose the sector, i.e. lowers LTJ , and raises
the sectors share in production. How does modernization driven by the productivity growth a¤ect
social identity, conict, and aggregate output?38 The next proposition, based on the propositions
in Appendix A, shows that the e¤ect di¤ers depending on the status of the nation SN :39 Note that
changes in other exogenous variables including a decrease in contested resources V have similar
e¤ects to an increase in SN ; as shown in Propositions 4 and 5:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the TFP of sector M , AM ; increases over time. Then,
(i) If the status of the nation SN is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the
nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict F is consistently low (high):
(ii) Otherwise, when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals identify with the nation (their ethnic
group): Given parameters and exogenous variables including SN ; multiple equilibria tend to exist
and thus social identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized.
(iii) For given AM , when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to be in an equilibrium with
low (high) F and LTJ and, under conditions that would hold for typical developing countries, a
high (low) level of aggregate output of the nal good Y (and aggregate material payo¤):
38Note that modernization is not the same as urbanization: traditional sectors correspond to the urban informal
sector as well as traditional agriculture and household production in the real economy. Many developing countries
experienced rapid urbanization without signicant modernization.
39As mentioned in footnote 23, even when reference groups of the nation (an ethnic group) include ethnic groups
(the nation) as well as other nations (ethnic groups) in the measure of the national status SN (the status of ethnic
group J , SJ ), results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 (and Appendix A) remain unchanged if "SN" is replaced with "SN SJ".
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If the status of the nation SN is at extremes, the society stays in the same equilibrium: when
the status is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with the nation (their ethnic
group) and the level of conict F is consistently low (high):
Otherwise, when SN is relatively high (low), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium, in which traditional sector workers are more likely to identify with their
ethnic group than modern sector workers, to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with
the nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict is low (high). The sectoral shift of workers
associated with modernization shakes prevailing social identities in both sectors: modern sector
workers become less attached to the national identity and traditional sector workers become less
attached to the ethnic identity. When SN is relatively high (low), it is usually the case that
the e¤ect on traditional (modern) sector workers determines the equilibrium shift and all become
identied with the nation (their group). Although the increase of the modern sector productivity,
AM ; always lowers LTJ and raises the sectors share in production, for given AM , the society with
high (low) national status SN tends to be in an equilibrium characterized by relatively large (small)
modern sector shares in employment and production and, under conditions that would hold for
typical developing nations, high (low) aggregate output of the nal good Y (and aggregate material
payo¤). That is, having su¢ ciently high national status is crucial in achieving universal national
identity, a low level of conict, high modern sector shares, and large output in the long run.
However, history or "luck" too is important, as long as the status is not at extremes. Given
parameters and exogenous variables including SN ; multiple equilibria tend to exist and thus social
identity, conict, and output di¤er depending on which equilibrium is realized.40 (This is the reason
for "tends to" in the statements of (ii) and (iii) of the proposition.) Suppose that an equilibrium
realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods, if the equilibrium continues to exist. Then, if
the initial equilibrium happens to be such that a relatively high proportion of individuals identify
with the nation, the society tends to be in an equilibrium with relatively strong national identity
and relatively good conditions in terms of the level of conict, modern sector shares, and aggregate
output subsequently. This is particularly so when the status is at intermediate level, in which case
multiple equilibria exist even in the long run (i.e., when AM is high).
3.3.1 Mechanism
The result would be understood more easily, rst by looking at the result when 1 = 0, that is,
when weights on ethnic attributes !e and on the national attribute !n of the perceived distance do
not depend on the level of conict F (see (12) and (13) in Section 2). In this case, F is the same
in all equilibria and equilibrium is unique for given parameters and exogenous variables. Figure
1 illustrates how the realized equilibrium di¤ers depending on SN and LTJ when 1 = 0: As AM
increases over time, LTJ decreases, whose value is determined by the indi¤erence condition for
the sectoral choice of the corresponding equilibrium. Thus, the society moves leftward with the
40 In the model of Sambanis and Shyao (2013) too, multiple equilibria exist when the status is not at extremes.
21
Figure 1: Equilibrium when 1 = 0
productivity growth in the gure.
When the status of the nation is very high (very low), all individuals always identify with
the nation (their ethnic group). By contrast, when the status is neither very high nor very low,
the realized equilibrium changes with the productivity growth. When the status is relatively high
(low), the society shifts from the equilibrium in which sector M workers identify with the nation
and sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group to the equilibrium in which all identify
with the nation (their ethnic group). That is, the social identity initially associated with modern
(traditional) sector workers becomes the shared identity eventually, when the status is high (low).
The growth of AM raises the modern sector income and induces the higher proportion of workers
to choose the sector. As a result, modern sector workers become less attached to the national
identity (the di¤erence in their utilities under the national identity and under the ethnic identity
falls), because the greater proportion of their ethnic group are in their sector and thus the perceived
distance of these workers under the ethnic identity falls more than under the national identity.41 In
other words, urban modern sector workers, who used to not nd an a¢ nity with most of their ethnic
group in rural areas or the urban informal sector, feel closer to their group because they have can
nd more people in the group similar to them in occupation or lifestyle. By contrast, traditional
sector workers become less attached to the ethnic identity, because the smaller proportion of their
fellow group are in their sector. That is, the sectoral shift of labor associated with modernization
shakes long-standing identities in both sectors. When the national status is high, the latter e¤ect
on traditional sector workers determines the equilibrium shift (because utilities under the national
identity are relatively high and thus the "identity shock" of modern sector workers are less severe)
and all become identied with the nation, while when the status is low, the former e¤ect on modern
41The perceived distance of modern sector workers falls under either identity but the fall under the ethnic identity
is greater, because changes in the average sectoral attributes are greater.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium when 1 > 0
sector workers determines the shift and all become identied with their ethnic group.
When 1 > 0, that is, when the weight on ethnic attributes !e increases and the one on the
national attribute !n of the perceived distance decreases with F , F is lower in an equilibrium with
the higher proportion of individuals identifying with the nation (Propositions 1 and 2). Further,
multiple equilibria could exist for given parameters and exogenous variables, and the two equilibria
in which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities too could exist. Multiple equilibria
could arise because of two-way positive causations between conict and ethnic identity: when the
level of conict is high (low), people care about ethnicity more (less) in measuring the distance
from social groups and thus they are more (less) likely to identify with their ethnic group, whereas
when the proportion of those identifying with their ethnic group is high (low), the level of conict is
high (low). The two heterogenous identity equilibria could exist because conict depends on social
identity when 1 > 0: workers in one of the sectors can be indi¤erent between the two identities
in equilibrium, only if their identity choice a¤ects fi and F and thus utilities under the identities
(note that the indi¤erence conditions (31) and (34) do not hold when 1 = 0).
Figure 2 illustrates how the realized equilibrium(a) di¤ers depending on SN and LTJ when
1 > 0; based on Propositions A1 and A2 in Appendix A.42 The equilibrium in which all identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) exists in the region above the upward-sloping solid curve (on
or below the downward-sloping solid curve). The equilibrium in which sector M workers identify
with the nation and sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group exists in the region with
42The gure is for the case when !s is relatively high and 1 is relatively low. Appendix A presents a gure when
!s is relatively low and 1 is relatively high (Figure 5). Although relative positions of several curves are di¤erent,
basic features of the gure are similar to this one.
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triple-dashed double-dotted lines, the one in which those in sector M are divided over identities
and all in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group exists in the region with negatively-sloped
lines, and the one in which those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sector M
identify with the nation exists in the region with positively-sloped lines.
Suppose, for example, that the society starts with the equilibrium in which sector M workers
identify with the nation and sector TJ workers identify with their ethnic group. As long as it stays
in this equilibrium, with the growth of AM , LTJ and thus the proportion of individuals identifying
with their ethnic group decrease, which leads to a fall in the level of conict, the higher share of the
modern sector, and higher aggregate output and material payo¤.43 ;44 However, this equilibrium
ceases to exist and the society shifts to another equilibrium eventually. As the gure shows, if
SN is relatively high (low), it shifts to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with the
nation (their ethnic group) and the level of conict falls (rises), where the rise of F when SN is
low may be interpreted as a rise in non-violent conict such as rent-seeking activities if it occurs at
relatively low LTJ .45 The sectoral shift and output growth continue, but, given the modern sector
productivity AM , LTJ is lower, and the share of the modern sector, output, and material payo¤ are
higher in the equilibrium of universal national identity.
The gure shows that there are several regions in which multiple equilibria exist. The two
equilibria in which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities exist only in such
regions. Suppose, for example, that the society starts with the region in which the following three
equilibria   the equilibrium in which sector M workers identify with the nation and sector TJ
workers identify with their ethnic group, the one in which all identify with their ethnic group,
and the one in which sector M workers are divided over identities (and all in sectors TJ identify
with their group)   exist. Depending on which equilibrium happens to be realized initially, social
identity, the level of conict, sectoral composition, and aggregate output in subsequent periods
di¤er; clearly the outcome is worst when the society starts with the equilibrium in which all
identify with their ethnic group and is best at least temporarily when it starts with the equilibrium
in which sectorM (sector TJ) workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group). Further, when
SN is such that multiple equilibria exist even when LTJ is low, i.e. when SN is at an intermediate
level in the gure, the long-run outcome of the society starting with the equilibrium in which sector
M (sector TJ) workers identify with the nation (their ethnic group) varies greatly depending on
to which equilibrium the society happens to shift : the best (worst) is the shift to the one in which
all identify with the nation (their ethnic group).
43As mentioned above, it is supposed that an equilibrium realized initially is maintained in subsequent periods if
the equilibrium continues to exist.
44Actually, it is also possible that the proportion of individuals identifying with their ethnic group and the conict
level increase over time while LTJ is relatively high. This is the case when the society is in the equilibrium in which
those in sector TJ are divided over identities and all in sectors M identify with the nation. As mentioned just after
(35), the proportion of those in sector TJ identifying with their ethnic group increases with a decrease in LTJ :
45The equilibrium shift changes F discontinuously, while it changes LTJ continuously.
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3.3.2 Discussion
As mentioned in Introduction, there exist competing theses on e¤ects of modernization on social
identity in political science. The classic thesis, which is based on the past experience of Europe,
argues that modernization leads to widespread national identity at the expense of ethnic and other
subnational identities (Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Weber, 1979), while another inuential
thesis ("second-generation" thesis) mainly focusing on Africa, argues that modernization rather
breeds ethnic identication (Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Bates, 1983).
The proposition shows that, when the status of the nation is relatively high (low), the society
tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) characterized by a low (high) level of conict, relatively high
(low) modern sector shares in employment and production, and high (low) aggregate output and
material payo¤. Thus, as far as the relatively long term e¤ect of modernization (the e¤ect involving
the equilibrium shift) is concerned, the result is consistent with the classic view when the status is
relatively high, while it is consistent with the "second-generation" view when it is relatively low.
By contrast, Robinson (2014), using cross-sectional individual-level survey data of sixteen
African nations, nds that, when Tanzania is excluded from the sample, GDP per capita is signi-
cantly and positively related to identifying with the nation above their ethnic group, after control-
ling for various individual-level (such as formal sector employment), group-level and country-level
variables. She interprets the evidence as suggesting that modernization (higher GDP per capita)
leads to national identity. The evidence may be regarded as capturing the relatively short term
e¤ect in an economy with a low degree of modernization, considering that it is based on cross-
sectional data of mostly poor African nations. Indeed, the e¤ect of an increase in AM under a
given equilibrium is consistent with her interpretation, when SN is not at extremes and LTJ is
su¢ ciently high that the society is in a heterogenous identity equilibrium,46 as long as sector TJ
workers are not divided over identities, in which case the e¤ect is negative (see Figure 2).47
The proposition also shows that multiple equilibria exist and the outcome depends on history
or "luck" when the national status is not at extremes. As Sambanis and Shayo (2013) stress, this is
consistent with the empirical nding that countries similar in ethnic diversity, geography, economic
conditions, and political institutions have diverse histories regarding levels of ethnic conict.
46Di¤erent interpretations of her evidence too are possible. The evidence is partly consistent with the story that,
for given modern sector productivity AM , national identity and modernization are positively related through positive
e¤ects of the national status on these variables (Figure 2 and Proposition 3 (iii)). That is, when SN is higher, for
given AM ; the society tends to be in an equilibrium with the higher proportion of individuals identifying with the
nation and lower LTJ (thus the higher degree of modernization). Further, the evidence can partly be explained by
multiple equilibria too, because national identity and modernization are positively related among di¤erent equilibria
with given parameters and exogenous variables (Propositions 1 and 2). In order to distinguish the di¤erent stories
empirically, it would be important to estimate regression models with enough control variables (including measures
capturing the national status and the modern sector productivity) using longitudinal data, although such data is not
available presently. Analysis using longitudinal data is also called for examining empirically the relatively long term
e¤ect of modernization, on which this paper and the above-cited studies in political science mainly focus.
47 In the equilibrium in which sector TJ workers are divided over identities, F increases with a decrease in LTJ
from (34). Then, the number of those identifying with their ethnic group, (1 PTJ;n)neLTJ ; increases with a decrease
in LTJ from (35).
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What are policy implications of the result that having su¢ ciently high national status is crucial
in achieving the good outcome? The national status represents peoples evaluations of its interna-
tional standing or reputation, particularly compared to neighboring nations, in "soft" dimensions
such as culture, history, sports, and widely shared values (for example, human rights and democ-
racy) as well as in "hard" dimensions such as military strength and territory. Clearly, policies can
a¤ect some of them. Miguel (2004) and Collier (2009), based on case study and statistical analysis,
argue that "nation-building" policies, including the promotion of a national language and school
education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, are e¤ective in strengthening national
identity. Classic modernization theories of nationalism (Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Weber,
1979) do stress the importance of the unication of language and the spread of common culture
and values through school education and universal military service for widespread national identity,
drawing on the past experience of Europe.
According to the model, these policies can be interpreted as policies raising the national status
SN : The model shows how these policies can reinforce national identity and brings the good outcome
in conict and development. The result suggests that they are critical for the good outcome in
countries where the status is low because of the lack of shared culture, history, and values, such as
many African nations. In such countries, without "nation-building" policies, people stick to their
ethnic identity, ethnic conict is frequent, and, for given modern sector productivity, the degree
of modernization and output are low. Policies promoting modernization (in the model, policies
raising the growth of AM ) alone cannot attain the good outcomes. By contrast, the result suggests
that, in countries with high national status, policies promoting modernization, such as policies
stimulating the technological progress of the modern sector, the reform of institutions supporting
the sectors economic activities, and the construction of transportation infrastructure connecting
rural areas to urban areas, would be enough for the good outcome.48
Alternatively, these "nation-building" policies may be interpreted as policies making shared
nationality more salient, i.e. raising !n, and ethnicity less salient, i.e. reducing !e; in the perceived
distance. Indeed, the following proposition shows that a decrease in 0 that raises !n and lowers
!e has similar e¤ects to an increase in SN : (Note that !e = 0+1F and !n = 1 !s  (0+1F):)
Proposition 4 Suppose that AM increases over time. Then, results similar to Proposition 3 hold
for 0 when "high (low) SN" is replaced with "low (high) 0". Specically, when 0 is low (high),
the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one in which all individuals
identify with the nation (their ethnic group); given other things equal.
Graphically, this result holds because all the dividing lines of Figure 2 shift downward when 0
decreases.
Empirical importance of "nation-building" policies on social identity seems to be supported.
Miguel (2004) bases the above-mentioned argument on ndings from the comparison of Tanzania
48The e¤ect of transportation infrastructure can be examined in the slightly modied model in which earnings in
the traditional sector are lower than earnings in the modern sector due to the presence of the cost of moving from
the former sector to the latter. Improved infrastructure lowers the moving cost and thus stimulates modernization.
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and Kenya, which largely shared geography, history, and colonial institutional legacy, but conducted
sharply di¤erent ethnic policies after independence in areas such as national language and public
school education and exhibit large di¤erences in the strength of national identity. Robinson (2014)
nds that the positive relation between GDP per capita and national identity becomes insignicant
once Tanzania is included into the sample because the national identity of Tanzania is "too strong"
for given levels of control variables. More direct evidence is obtained for a developed country: Clots-
Figueras and Masella (2013) examine e¤ects of the introduction of a bilingual (Catalan and Spanish)
education system in Catalonia using survey data and nd that the number of years exposed to the
bilingual system is positively related to the strength of Catalan identity and the propensity to vote
for a party with a Catalanist platform.
3.4 E¤ects of contested resources
Finally, e¤ects of the amount of contested resources V are examined. Specically, how does it
a¤ect the level of conict F and how does it inuence the e¤ects of the productivity growth on
identity, conict, and development? The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 (i) The level of conict F increases with resources V in all equilibria.
(ii) Suppose that the TFP of sector M , AM ; increases over time. Then, results similar to Proposi-
tion 3 hold for V when "low (high) SN" is replaced with "large (small) V ". Specically, when
V is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous identity equilibrium to the one
in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group (the nation).
The rst result, which is consistent with many empirical studies on armed internal conict such
as Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) and Ross (2006), is standard and intuitive: as the amount of contested
resources increases, people contribute more to conict and thus the conict level increases.
The second result states that similar results to Proposition 3 hold for resources V , when "low
(high) SN" of the proposition is replaced with "large (small) V ". Specically, given the national
status, when the amount of resources is large (small), the society tends to shift from a heterogenous
identity equilibrium to the equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group (the
nation) with the productivity growth of the modern sector. That is, the abundance of contested
resources is an impediment for the society to achieve universal national identity, a low level of
conict, a high share of the modern sector, and high aggregate output. Remember that the
contested resources represent both material resources (such as natural resources) and a part of the
governmental budget for group-specic club goods whose allocation over the groups is determined
by the consequences of violent conict or non-violent conict (such as rent-seeking activities).
Hence, the result suggests that not only the abundance of material resources but also the lack of
strong political and economic institutions, which leads to the abundance of contested resources, are
hindrances to the desirable outcome. The result is consistent with the classic thesis on e¤ects of
modernization on social identity if resources are not abundant or institutions are good in quality,
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otherwise it is consistent with the competing thesis, as far as the relatively long term e¤ect of
modernization is concerned.
Graphically, the result holds because all the dividing lines of Figure 2 shift upward when V
increases. When the amount of contested resources increases, the level of conict rises in all
equilibria and thus people care about ethnicity more, i.e. !e increases, (nationality less, i.e. !n
decreases) in measuring perceived distances from social groups. Given the national status, this
makes identifying with their ethnic group relatively more attractive compared to identifying with
the nation.
In the real society, modernization could raise the amount of contested resources, such as public-
sector jobs, approvals and licenses for regulated business activities, and budgets for local schools
and infrastructures, if political and economic institutions are weak. Thus, the above result implies
that, as "second-generation" modernization theories of nationalism (Melson and Wolpe, 1970;
Bates, 1983) argue, modernization has, through the increased contested resources, negative e¤ects
on national identity, ethnic conict, and development in a society with low institutional quality.
The result in Section 3.3, however, shows that, even when contested resources do not increase with
modernization, modernization could lead to negative outcomes in a society with low institutional
quality, low national status, or people who care much about ethnic di¤erences.
Consistent with the result, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) nd negative e¤ects of natural
resources on economic development when institutions are weak. Empirical works also suggest that
political and economic institutions have important e¤ects on civil conict (Renyal-Querol, 2002),
rent-seeking activities (Easterly, 2001), and development (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004).
The above result reveals a novel mechanism interacting with social identity that resources and
institutions a¤ect ethnic conict and development.
4 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that ethnic divisions or diversity in a society leads to negative out-
comes in various dimensions, including civil conict and economic development. It is often argued
that the lack of shared social identity, that is, the dominance of subnational (particularly, ethnic)
identities over national identity, lies behind the negative outcomes in ethnically heterogenous so-
cieties. If shared national identity is important, how can it be realized? In political science, there
exist conicting theses emphasizing e¤ects of modernization on national identity, the classic thesis
claiming the positive e¤ect and the competing one claiming the negative e¤ect. Which thesis is
more relevant under what conditions? How does modernization a¤ect identity, conict, and out-
put? How do "nation-building" policies, such as the promotion of a national language and school
education emphasizing common history, culture, and values, a¤ect the outcomes?
In order to examine these questions theoretically, this paper has developed a model of social
identity, ethnic conict, and development. In the model, individuals choose a sector to work
(between the modern sector and a traditional sector), social identity (between ethnic identity and
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national identity), and contributions to conict. Thus, the degree of modernization (and output),
identity, and conict interact with each other.
It has been found that, given other things equal, a society with higher national status, less con-
tested resources, better institutions, or ethnic di¤erences less salient in peoples minds tends to be
in an equilibrium with the higher proportion of people identifying with the nation, the lower level
of conict, higher modern sector shares in employment and production (higher degree of modern-
ization), and higher output. Simple dynamic analysis has shown that, as modernization proceeds,
a society tends to shift to an equilibrium with uniformly national identity and good outcomes in
conict and development, if the status is high, the resources are not abundant, institutions are good
in quality, or ethnic di¤erences are not salient; otherwise, it tends to shift to an equilibrium with
uniformly ethnic identity and the worse outcomes in other dimensions. Hence, the model is consis-
tent with the classic (competing) thesis on e¤ects of modernization on identity under the former
(latter) situation. The result suggests that, under the latter situation, policies improving institu-
tional quality, raising the national status, or making shared nationality more salient are crucial for
the good outcomes. The model shows how "nation-building" policies, which may be interpreted as
policies raising the national status or making shared nationality more salient, can reinforce national
identity and bring better outcomes. The model has also revealed a novel mechanism interacting
with identity that resources and institutions a¤ect conict and development.
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Appendix A Existence conditions of equilibria
This Appendix presents precise conditions (combinations of parameters and exogenous variables)
under which each equilibrium exists. The propositions in this Appendix are the basis for Proposi-
tions 3 5 and Figures 1 and 2 in Section 3.
A.1 Homogenous identity equilibria
The next proposition presents the existence conditions for the two homogenous identity equilib-
ria. In the proposition, d2[F;cs] 
h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+cs!s
i
(cs is a coe¢ cient on !s); c(F )
1


ne 1
ne
 
 1
 
 VF
 
 1   VF  1  1 :
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Figure 3: Proposition A1
Proposition A1 (i) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic group exists
for any LTJ when SN  d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e ); and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy] when SN 2
d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e ); d2[F e ; 0] c(F e )
i
; where LTJ=(LTJ)e is the solution for (22)
and (LTJ)yy is the one for d2
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
(LTJ)
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N
2 c(F e )=SN :
(ii) The equilibrium in which all identify with the nation exists for any LTJ when SN >d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 
c(F n); and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)]]) when SN2

d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
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where LTJ=(LTJ)n is the solution for (27) and (LTJ)]] is the one for d2
h
F n ;(ne 1) (LTJ)
]]
N

2 ne (LTJ)
]]
N
i
 
c(F n)=SN :
Based on the proposition, Figure 3 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which the
homogenous identity equilibria exist. In the gure, the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation exists in the region above the upward-sloping curve and the one in which all identify with
their ethnic group exists in the region on or below the downward-sloping curve. That is, given
LTJ , the former (latter) equilibrium tends to exist when SN is high (low), and given SN ; the two
equilibria tend to exist when LTJ is low, where LTJ is determined by the indi¤erence condition
for sectoral choices of the corresponding equilibrium. Note that both equilibria exist in the region
with slant lines.
A.2 Heterogenous identity equilibria
The next proposition presents the existence conditions for the three heterogenous identity equilibria.
Proposition A2 (i) The equilibrium in which workers in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic
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group and those in sectorM identify with the nation exists i¤ d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 
c(Fd(LTJ))<SN  d2
h
Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 c(Fd(LTJ)); where Fd(LTJ) is the
solution for (28) and increases with LTJ and LTJ = (LTJ)d is the solution for (29).
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(ii) The equilibrium in which those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ
identify with their ethnic group exists i¤ d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 c(Fd(LTJ))<SN <
d2

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
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N
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(iii) The equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sectorM iden-
tify with the nation exists for LTJ 2((LTJ)]; (LTJ)]]) when SN 2
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Based on the proposition, Figure 4 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which each
equilibrium including the homogenous identity equilibria exists when !s (the weight on sectoral
attributes in the perceived distance) is relatively high and 1 (the strength of the e¤ect of F on the
weights on ethnic and national attributes) is relatively low.51 The equilibrium in which workers in
sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation exists in
the region with triple-dashed double-dotted lines (the lower borderline is not included), the one in
49To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [(LTJ)]; Nne ] when
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51To be more accurate, this is the case when 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is the value of SN at the intersection of the bottom dotted curve with LTJ = 0 (LTJ = Nne ). The LHS of the last
inequality increases with !s, while the RHS can be shown to increase with 1:
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Figure 4: Proposition A2 when !s is relatively high and 1 is relatively low
which those in sector M are divided over identities and all in sectors TJ identify with their ethnic
group exists in the region with negatively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included), and the
one in which those in sectors TJ are divided over identities and all in sector M identify with the
nation exists in the region with positively-sloped lines (both borderlines are not included). As in
Figure 3, the equilibrium in which all identify with the nation (their ethnic group) exists in the
region above the upward-sloping solid curve (on or below the downward-sloping solid curve).
Given LTJ (which is determined by the indi¤erence condition for sectoral choices of the corre-
sponding equilibrium), the heterogenous identity equilibria tend to exist when SN is neither very
high nor very low, and given SN ; the equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ identify with their
ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation tends to exist when LTJ is large. Note
that there are several regions in which multiple equilibria exist. In particular, the two equilibria in
which workers in one of the sectors are divided over identities exist only in such regions. All ve
equilibria exist in the small triangular region on the left side of the gure.
Figure 5 illustrates combinations of LTJ and SN under which each equilibrium exists when !s
is relatively low and 1 is relatively high. Unlike Figure 4, the value of SN at the intersection of
the downward-sloping solid curve with LTJ = 0 is greater than the one at the intersection of the
upward-sloping solid curve with LTJ = neN , and the value of SN at the intersection of the bottom
dotted curve with LTJ = 0 is smaller than the one at the intersection of the curve with LTJ = neN :
However, basic features of the gure are similar to the previous one.
Appendix B Proofs
Proof of the uniqueness of (LTJ)d. The derivative of the LHS of (29) with respect to LTJ equals
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Figure 5: Proposition A2 when !s is relatively low and 1 is relatively high
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where, from (28),
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The second derivative of the LHS of (29) with respect to LTJ equals
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Since, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 (iii), the LHS of (29) is always lower than that of
(22), (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e holds. Thus, the derivative of the LHS of (22) for LTJ  (LTJ)d is negative,
that is,  (1 )AT (LTJ) 2+2!s neN < 0: From this inequality, the rst part of (38) is positive for
LTJ  (LTJ)d; since it is greater than (1 )AT (LTJ) 3

(2 ) LTJ ne 1N

> 0:
The second part of (38) is positive at LTJ  (LTJ)d when  = 2; because the second part of (36)
equals
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h
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which clearly increases with LTJ : Hence, the second derivative of the LHS of (29) is positive for
LTJ  (LTJ)d and thus (LTJ)d is unique when  = 2 (remember that the LHS of (29) is always lower
than that of (22) whose solution is unique (LTJ)e).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Straightforward from (20) and (26). (ii) Shown in footnotes 27 and
28.
(iii) Denote total output of the private good in the equilibrium in which all individuals identify
with the nation (their ethnic group) by Y n (Y e ). From (1) and (2),
Y n > Y

e , AT ((LTJ)n) AM (LTJ)n > AT ((LTJ)e) AM (LTJ)e (40)
,
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+ 2N (ne 1)((LTJ)n)2 > 0: (42)
Since (LTJ)e > (LTJ)n; the above condition holds when AM is not very high or AT is not very low
so that 2neN ((LTJ)

e+(LTJ)

n) 1 > 4neN (LTJ)n 1  0 is true, although the condition could hold even
when (LTJ)n is much lower than
N
4ne
if the second term dominates the rst term. For example, if
parameters and exogenous variables are such that (LTJ)n(LTJ)e (LTJ)n; then the inequality holds
when (LTJ)

n
N  14ne+2(ne 1) :
The derivative of total output with respect to LTJ equals ne
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and the second derivative equals
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(45)
from LTJ=

AT
AM
 1
1 
> 1:
Because (43) holds as !0, does not hold as !1; and the rst derivative of the LHS of the
equation is  1 as !0; and it increases as  goes up, there exists a 2(0; 1); which depends on
exogenous variables and parameters, below which (LTJ)n > LTJ and thus Y

n > Y

e hold.
By contrast, Y n < Y e holds if
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(LTJ)
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1  1
N

<AM from (22) and Assumption 2:
(46)
From a similar reasoning as above, if LTJ=

AT
AM
 1
1 
< N2ne , there exists a 2(0; 1) (> ) above
which (LTJ)e < LTJ and thus Y

n < Y

e hold. (Or, from (42), if parameters and exogenous variables
are such that (LTJ)n(LTJ)e (LTJ)n; then the inequality holds for any  when (LTJ)

n
N  16ne+2(ne 1) :)
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) F n < F Td is from (26) and (32), F

Md < F

e is from (20) and (35),
and F Td < F

d < F

Md is from (28), (32), and (35) and (LTJ)

Td < (LTJ)

d < (LTJ)

Md shown in (ii).
(ii) (LTJ)Td = (LTJ)

n and (LTJ)

Md = (LTJ)

e are shown in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. As shown in
footnote 27, the LHS of (22), the indi¤erence condition whose solution is (LTJ)e, decreases with
LTJ for LTJ  (LTJ)e:
Hence, given parameters and exogenous variables, (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e holds, if the LHS of (29), the
indi¤erence condition whose solution is (LTJ)d, is smaller than that of (22) at LTJ = (LTJ)

d; which
is true because
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(48)
where the inequality holds from (87) in the proof of Proposition A2.
As shown in footnote 28, the shape of the LHS of (27), the indi¤erence condition whose solution
is (LTJ)n, is similar to that of (22). Hence, (LTJ)d > (LTJ)

n holds if the LHS of (29) is greater than
that of (27) at LTJ = (LTJ)d; which is true because
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(50)
where the inequality holds from (88) in the proof of Proposition A2.
(iii) Denote total output of the private good in the equilibrium in which those in sector M
(sectors TJ) identify with the nation (their ethnic group) by Y d . From (1) and (2),
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Y n > Y

d , AT ((LTJ)n) AM (LTJ)n > AT ((LTJ)d) AM (LTJ)d (51)
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where the third equation is from (27) and (29).
Since (LTJ)d>(LTJ)

n from (ii) of the proposition and the second term is non-negative from the
equilibrium condition (88) in the proof of Proposition A2 (i); the above inequality holds when AM
is low enough or AT is high enough that 2N ((LTJ)

d+(LTJ)

n) 1 > 4N (LTJ)n 1  0 is true, although
the condition could hold even when (LTJ)n is much lower than
N
4 if the second term is large.
From (1) and (2),
Y e < Y

d , AT ((LTJ)e) AM (LTJ)e < AT ((LTJ)d) AM (LTJ)d (54)
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1CCA(LTJ)d < 0; (56)
where the third equation is from (22) and (29).
Since (LTJ)d < (LTJ)

e from (ii) of the proposition and the second term is negative from the
equilibrium condition (87) in the proof of Proposition A2 (i); the above inequality holds when
AM is low enough or AT is high enough that 2neN ((LTJ)

d+(LTJ)

e) 1 > 4neN (LTJ)d 1  0 is true,
although the condition could hold even when (LTJ)d is much lower than
N
4ne
if the second term is
large negative.
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As for the result on the relationship between  and the magnitude relation of Y d and Y

n or Y

e ;
the corresponding proof of Proposition 1 applies since (LTJ)e > (LTJ)d > (LTJ)

n holds (although the
condition for Y d > Y

e when  is su¢ ciently low and the one for Y

d > Y

n when  is su¢ ciently
high could be strengthened). Y Td = Y

n and Y

Md = Y

e are straightforward from (LTJ)

Td = (LTJ)

n
and (LTJ)Md = (LTJ)

e:
Proof of Proposition 4. It is enough to prove that the terms on the opposite side of SN of all
equilibrium conditions  the LHSs of (72) and (83) in the proof of Proposition A1 and of (87) and
(88) in the proof of Proposition A2  increase with 0 (that is, all dividing lines in Figure 2 shift
upward with an increase in 0). As for the homogeneous identity equilibria, since F is independent
of 0; the result is straightforward from (72) and (83). As for the equilibrium in which those in
sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in sector M identify with the nation, since F is
independent of 0 for given LTJ from (28); the result is straightforward from (87) and (88). (Each
term of the conditions of the remaining equilibria are same as one of these terms.)
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Straightforward from the equation determining F of each equilibrium,
(20), (26), (28), (29), (31), and (34).
(ii) It is enough to prove that the terms on the opposite side of SN of all equilibrium
conditions  the LHSs of (72) and (83) in the proof of Proposition A1 and of (87) and (88) in
the proof of Proposition A2  increase with V (that is, all dividing lines in Figure 2 shift upward
with an increase in V ).
[The equilibrium in which all identify with their ethnic group] The derivative of the LHS of
(72) in the proof of Proposition A1 with respect to V is, from (20),
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For F e =

 ne 1ne
V
F e
 1
 1
N and F n =
h
ne 1
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
 VF n
 1
i 1
 1
N not to be very similar, 1 must be of a
similar order of magnitude to  VF n and 
V
F e
: Then, 1  1N  VF e > 0 and thus the above derivative
is positive.
[The equilibrium in which all identify with the nation] Since dF

n
dV =
1
 1 

 1 
V
Fn 1
and
d( V
Fn )
dV =
1
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

 1 
V
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1
from (26), the derivative of the LHS of (83) with respect to V is,
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[The equilibrium in which those in sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in sector
M identify with the nation] From (28),
dFd(LTJ)
dV
=
1
 1
1
Fd(LTJ)

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)

1+ 1 1
V
[Fd(LTJ)]2

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)
 ;
(59)
d

V
Fd(LTJ)

dV
=
1
Fd(LTJ)
1+ 1 1
V
[Fd(LTJ)]2

ne 1
ne
 1
 1

 VFd(LTJ)
 1
 1 1
neLTJ+

 VFd(LTJ) 1
 1
 1 1
(N neLTJ)
 :
(60)
Thus, the derivative of the LHS of (87) or (88) with respect to V is,
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where the expression inside the large square bracket is greater than
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(Each term of the equilibrium condition of the remaining equilibria are same as one of the above
terms.)
Proof of Proposition A1. (i) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with their ethnic
group:
[Sector M ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector M equals, from (17) and (18),
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If he deviates and identies with the nation, the highest utility he gets is
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, not (fi;n)0 = 0, from the assumption (16), (FJ)0 = (fi;n)0+
N
ne
 1

fi;e; and F 0=(FJ)0+F J .
When N is large enough, the deviation by one player a¤ects aggregate values (FJ)
0 and F 0
very little, thus the above equation is approximated very well by the following equation that is
marginally larger than the original one
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[Sector TJ ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector TJ is, from (19) and (18),
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If he deviates and identies with the nation, the highest utility is well approximated by
AT (LTJ)
 1  1

(fi;n)
+
FJ
F
V  
(
!e
ne 1
ne
+!s
"
1 LTJ
N
2
+
P
K6=J

LTK
N
2#)
+SN : (69)
The deviation is not protable if
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[The equilibrium condition] From this equation and (67), if the condition for the modern sector
holds, so does the one for the traditional sector. Hence, (67) is the condition for the existence of
the equilibrium when LTJ is the solution for the indi¤erence condition (22). Since ethnic groups
are symmetric and thus values of aggregate variables of all groups are the same, (67) becomes
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where F e is given by (20), and d2[] ;c(); and SN are as dened just before the proposition.
The condition holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when 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(ii) The equilibrium in which all individuals identify with the nation:
[Sector TJ ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector TJ is, from (25) and (24),
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If he deviates and identies with his ethnic group, the highest utility he gets is
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When N is large enough, the deviation by one player a¤ects aggregate values (FJ)
00
and (F )
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very little, thus the above equation is approximated very well by the following equation that is
marginally smaller than the original one
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The deviation is not protable if52
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[Sector M ] The utility of individual i of ethnic group J in sector M equals, from (23) and (24),
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If he deviates and identies with his ethnic group, the highest utility is well approximated by
52The equation must hold with strict inequality because the deviants approximate utility is marginally smaller
than the true utility.
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[The equilibrium condition] From this equation and (78), if the condition for sector TJ holds,
so does the one for sector M . Hence, (78) is the condition for the existence of this equilibrium
when LTJ is the solution for the indi¤erence condition (27). Since ethnic groups are symmetric ,
(78) becomes
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ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJ
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
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
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(83)
, d2

F n ;(ne 1)
LTJ
N

2 neLTJ
N

 c(F n)<SN ; (84)
where F n is the solution for (26).
The above inequality holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN > d2
h
F n ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F n); and
for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)]]) when SN2

d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F n ;
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i
 c(F n)
i
; where (LTJ)]] is
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d2
h
F n ;(ne 1) (LTJ)
]]
N

2 ne (LTJ)
]]
N
i
 c(F n)=SN :
Proof of Proposition A2. [The proof that no other heterogenous identity equilibria exist] If
workers in sector M weakly prefer to identify with their ethnic group, from (67), the following
must hold in a symmetric equilibrium:


(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  1  1SN : (85)
If workers in sector TJ weakly prefer to identify with the nation, from (78), the following must
hold in a symmetric equilibrium:

h
(0+1F)
ne 1
ne
+!s(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
  1

ne 1
ne
 
 1
 
 VF
 
 1   VF  1  1SN : (86)
Both conditions cannot hold simultaneously and thus such situations do not arise in equilibrium.
(i) The equilibrium in which workers in sector T identify with their ethnic group and those in
sector M identify with the nation:
[Sector M ] Because workers in sector M identify with the nation, the condition for them not
to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the equation becomes
44
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(87)
, d2
"
Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2#
 c(Fd(LTJ))<SN ;
where Fd(LTJ) is the solution for (28) and increases with LTJ :
The relation between the LHS of the equation and LTJ is ambiguous, but the relation is positive
for small LTJ because the derivative of the LHS at LTJ = 0 is positive.
[Sector TJ ] Because workers in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, the condition for
them not to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (71) as in the equilibrium in which all identify
with their group.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the equation becomes
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(88)
, d2
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Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJ
N

2 neLTJ
N

 c(Fd(LTJ))SN ; (89)
where the LHS increases with LTJ from (28).
Thus, the condition holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN  d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); and for
LTJ 2 [(LTJ)]; Nne ] when SN2

d2[F n ; 0] c(F n); d2
h
F e ;
ne 1
ne
i
 c(F e )
i
; where (LTJ)] is the
solution for d2
h
Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 c(Fd(LTJ))=SN :
[The equilibrium condition] Hence, the equilibrium exists i¤ d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 
c(Fd(LTJ))<SN d2
h
Fd(LTJ);(ne 1)LTJN

2 ne LTJN
i
 c(Fd(LTJ)); where Fd(LTJ) is the solu-
tion for (28) and increases with LTJ and LTJ = (LTJ)d is the solution for (29).
To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [(LTJ)]; Nne ] when
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d2

Fd(LTJ); (ne 1)ne

LTJ
N
2 c(Fd(LTJ)); 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(ii) The equilibrium in which those in sector M are divided over their identities and all in
sectors TJ identify with their ethnic group:
[Sector M ] As shown in Section 3.2.2, the following indi¤erence condition for identity choices
of sector M workers must hold
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(0+1F)
ne 1
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 !sne(ne 1)

LTJ
N
2  1ne 1ne   1  VF  1   VF  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SN ; (31)
where F satises
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F =
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 1
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 
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
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Given LTJ ; the LHS of (31) increases with F and F satisfying (32) decreases with PM;n: Hence,
F and PM;n satisfying both equations exist i¤
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where F e is given by (20) and Fd(LTJ) is given by (28) and increases with LTJ :
The second inequality of (90) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN <d2
h
F e ; ne 1ne
i
 c(F e );
and for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy) when SN 2
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SN :
The LHS of the rst inequality is same as (29) in (i), thus the relation between the LHS and
LTJ is positive for small LTJ but generally ambiguous.
[Sector TJ ] Because workers in sector TJ identify with their ethnic group, the condition for
them not to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify
with their ethnic group. In the symmetric equilibrium, the condition becomes
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where F is the solution for (31) and (32). When (90) and thus (31) hold, this condition holds for
certain.
[The equilibrium condition] Hence, from (90), the equilibrium exists i¤d2

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LTJ
N
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SN <d
2
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and increases with LTJ and LTJ = (LTJ)e is the solution for (22).
To be more detailed, the equilibrium exists for LTJ 2 [0; (LTJ)yy) when
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where (LTJ)yy is LTJ satisfying 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
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N
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SN :
(iii) The equilibrium in which those in sectors TJ are divided over their identities and all in
sector M identify with the nation:
[Sector TJ ] As shown in Section 3.2.3, the following indi¤erence condition for identity choices
of sector TJ workers must hold
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where F satises
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Given LTJ ; the LHS of (34) increases with F; and F satisfying (35) decreases with PTJ;n: Hence,
F and PTJ;n satisfying both equations exist i¤
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(92)
where F n is given by (26) and Fd(LTJ) is given by (28) and increases with LTJ :
Thus, the rst inequality of (92) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN > d2
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2 ne LTJN
i
 c(F n)=SN :
The second inequality of (92) holds for any LTJ 2 [0; Nne ] when SN < d2[F n ; 0] c(F n);
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[Sector M ] Because workers in sector M identify with the nation, the condition for them not
to deviate from the equilibrium is given by (82) as in the equilibrium in which all identify with the
nation. In the symmetric equilibrium, the condition becomes
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where F is the solution for (34) and (35). When (92) and thus (34) hold, this condition holds for
certain.
[The equilibrium condition] Hence, when LTJ is the solution for (27); the equilibrium exists for
LTJ 2((LTJ)]; (LTJ)]]) when 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